In this paper we analyze a situation in which several firms deal with inventory problems concerning the same type of product. We consider that each firm uses its limited capacity warehouse for storing purposes and that it faces an economic order quantity model where storage costs are irrelevant (and assumed to be zero) and shortages are allowed. In this setting, we show that firms can save costs by placing joint orders and obtain an optimal order policy for the firms. Besides, we identify an associated class of costs games which we show to be concave. Finally, we introduce and study a rule to share the costs among the firms which provides core allocations and can be easily computed.
Introduction
The analysis of centralized inventory models is a flourishing research field in the frontier between game theory and operations research. In a centralized inventory model several agents facing individual inventory problems cooperate by coordinating their orders for the purpose of reducing costs. In the analysis of one of these models two main issues are usually addressed: first, what is the optimal order policy of the group of cooperating agents; second, how the order costs should be shared among the agents. Nagarajan and Sosić (2008) , Dror and Hartman (2011) and Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2012) are recent surveys of centralized inventory models; Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011) reviews the applications of cooperative game theory for sharing cost problems.
In most inventory models a positive storage cost per item and time unit is assumed to exist.
However, in some situations storage costs are fixed (i.e. independent of the size of the stock) and therefore can be disregarded in the optimization problem. This can be the case, for instance, when the storage costs are only due to the maintenance of the warehouse. Notice that when storage costs are irrelevant and fixed order costs are positive, in a continuous review setting, the orders should be as large as possible and, thus, the capacities of the warehouses become significant; moreover, the corresponding optimization problem will be trivial, unless shortages are allowed.
In this paper we analyze a situation in which several firms deal with inventory problems concerning the same type of product. We consider that each firm uses its limited capacity warehouse for storing purposes and that it faces an economic order quantity model where storage costs are irrelevant (and assumed to be zero) and shortages are allowed. We first deal with the one decision maker case, and then we study the case with n firms. We show that firms can save costs by placing joint orders and obtain an optimal order policy for the firms; then we obtain some results that can be helpful for allocating the joint costs among them.
An antecedent of this paper is Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) , which deals with an inventory problem arising in a farming community in the Northwest of Spain. It considers a collection of stockbreeders (each one owning a relatively small livestock farm) that need livestock feed and place orders to an external supplier. Each farm has its own silo (warehouse), with limited capacity, for keeping the feed. The only costs associated with the silos are their building costs since their maintenance costs are irrelevant; thus, the storage cost of each stockbreeder is in fact zero. Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) analyzes then a model with n decision makers, all them facing continuous review inventory problems without holding costs, with limited capacity warehouses and without shortages. The fact that shortages are not allow simplifies strongly the search for optimal policies, as we remarked above. However, the case with shortages can be also used to analyze analogous problems to the ones dealt with in that paper. In fact, the stockbreeders can incur in little shortages since they can get extra feed from their own. Nevertheless, this extra feed is usually of lower quality and, thus, there are losses associated with the shortages.
There are many papers dealing with limited capacity inventory models. In fact, most of the classical and modern books on inventory management include the basic ideas on capacitated inventory; see, for instance, Tersine (1994) and Zipkin (2000) . A survey on capacitated lot sizing can be found in Karimi et al. (2003) . More recently, Ng et al. (2009) study an economic order quantity model where the warehouse capacity is limited and is, moreover, a decision variable of the model. Parker and Kapucinski (2011) consider the non-cooperative interaction between a retailer and a supplier in a two-stage, periodic review, limited capacity inventory model; they find a Markov equilibrium policy in their model.
On the contrary, as far as we know, apart from Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) , the literature has not treated centralized inventory models with limited capacity and fixed storage costs.
However, there are a variety of real situations which may be modeled in this way, like the example treated in Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) and in this paper. This example is based on a situation that we have encountered while collaborating with an agricultural cooperative in the Northwest of Spain.
The model
An EOQ (Economic Order Quantity) system without holding costs is a multiple agent situation where each agent faces a continuous review inventory problem with no holding costs, with shortages and with a limited capacity warehouse. N denotes the finite set of agents. The parameters associated to every i ∈ N in one of these systems are:
• a > 0, the fixed cost per order,
• b i > 0, the shortage cost per item and per time unit,
• d i > 0, the deterministic demand per time unit,
This model is in fact a generalization of one introduced in Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) : the basic EOQ system without holding costs. These basic systems do not allow for shortages and, then, the analysis of the model we introduce in this paper is fully different. In an EOQ system without holding costs every agent i ∈ N has to make a decision on his maximum shortage level β i . In the system operation, every time that i's maximum shortage level is reached, i places an order of size K i + β i (since the storage cost is zero, i's warehouse should be complete after each order). Then, agent i's average cost per cycle is given by
and agent i's average cost per time unit is given by
where β i > −K i in order to guarantee a positive length cycle. 1 We rewrite the agent i's cost function as
For simplicity we take the number of orders per time unit as the decision variable, that is
which implies that
Then agent i's cost function can be written as
Observe that the ratios demand/capacity (d i /K i ) play an important role in the cost functions of the agents. They will also play a relevant role in other issues regarding this model as we will see later on, especially in Section 5.
In this paper we explore the possibilities of cooperation in an EOQ system without holding costs. When we look at this model from a cooperative point of view, we consider that a nonempty coalition S ⊂ N has formed and that all its members place joint orders. It means that the length cycle will be the same for every agent in S, i.e.
for every i, j ∈ S. Equivalently, x i = x j for every i, j ∈ S, i.e., the number of orders per time unit will be the same for every agent in S. For simplicity we denote x = x i for every i ∈ S. Now, the average cost per cycle that coalition S faces is given by
and the average cost per time unit is given by
Using the condition of equal length cycle (2), we have that
Individual optimal order policies
Now we obtain the optimal order policy and the minimum average cost per time unit of each agent i when ordering alone. Note that C i is a continuous function for every x i > 0. Besides, it is strictly increasing for every
It is a differentiable function and attains a local extreme at x i if its derivative in x i equals zero,
i.e. if 2a
The unique value in (0,
) satisfying (6) is
notice that
, the second derivative of C i is
Then, C i is strictly convex in (0,
) and, moreover, x * i is the unique minimum of C i in (0,
). Now, the continuity of C i in (0, ∞), (8), and the fact that C i is strictly increasing in [
Using (5) and (7) it can be easily checked that the minimum average cost per time unit of each agent i when ordering alone
Notice that C i (x * i ) can also be written as
where
Clearly, in view of (1), β * i is the optimal maximum shortage level for agent i in this context.
Coalitional optimal order policies
In this section we obtain the optimal order policy and the minimum average cost per time unit of a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N when all its members cooperate by placing joint orders. For every such S ⊂ N and every x ∈ (0, +∞) denote by S x the set {i ∈ S :
In view of the expression of C S given in (3), we can write
It is easy to check that this function is continuous. Moreover, if A S denotes the set {
It is moreover easy to check that the right and left derivatives of C S coincide for every x ∈ A S , so it is in fact differentiable in every x ∈ (0, +∞). Its first derivative is given by
Again, it is clear that
Looking at the sign of its derivative we obtain that d dx C S is increasing in every x ∈ (0, +∞) \ A S and that it is strictly increasing in every x ∈ (0, max i∈S
continuous, it is clear that it is increasing in every x ∈ (0, +∞) and strictly increasing in every x ∈ (0, max i∈S
). Thus C S is a convex function in (0, +∞) and strictly convex in (0, max i∈S
and C S is strictly increasing in (max i∈S
, +∞), there exists a unique extreme of C S in (0, +∞), which is a minimum. Now, C S is continuous and differentiable in (0, +∞) and it has a unique minimum in (0, +∞) implies that this minimum is attained at the unique point x * S in which its first derivative is zero. Thus, x * S is the unique solution of the following equation:
In order to avoid a cumbersome notation from now on we denote i(S) := S x * S . In view of (10) and (11), we have that
Notice that, as it should be, (12) reduces to (9) when S = {i} (for any i ∈ N). Besides, like in the individual setting treated in the former section, we can express C S (x * S ) in terms of the maximum shortage levels of the agents in S when x * S is adopted. Indeed, in view of (12),
where β * S i is the maximum shortage level of agent i ∈ S when coalition S places joint orders and uses an optimal order policy.
One may wonder now how to solve equation (11). Next we describe an iterative algorithm to solve it easily and to compute x * S and i(S) for any non-empty S ⊂ N. Denote s = |S|.
Algorithm 4.1.
1. Let S = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i s } be the agents in S arranged in non-decreasing order of the ratios demand/capacity. Thus
2. Initialize k = s + 1, T = ∅, x T = 0, and S x T = S.
Do while S x T = T:
Set k = k − 1, T = T ∪ {i k }, and compute
4. Let i(S) = T and x * S = x T . STOP.
Let us note that the above algorithm finishes after a finite number of steps (smaller than or equal to s) since equation (11) has a unique solution.
The following result shows a kind of monotonicity of the optimal number of orders of a non-empty coalition. It is an attractive property; moreover we use it later on in this paper.
Theorem 4.1. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs and take a pair of non-empty coalitions P, S ⊂ N with P ⊂ S. Then x * P ≤ x * S .
Proof. See Appendix.
To finish this section we present an example that we have encountered while collaborating with an agricultural cooperative in the Northwest of Spain. We use this example to illustrate the concepts introduced up to now, as well as Algorithm 4.1. This example has been also considered in Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) , but now we consider that shortages are allowed.
Example 4.1. This example is based on feedback obtained from dairy farmers in northwestern Spain, although the data considered here are fictitious. A standard dairy farm in northwestern Spain has between 40 and 150 dairy cows. The cow feeding is varied and the feeding ration must have the necessary nutrients to maintaining a high daily production of milk (between 25 and 35 liters). The feeding ration can be decomposed into two parts. On one hand, a part that has to be stored at the farm in warehouses, called silos. On the other hand, a part that must be daily obtained and that cannot be stored. We are interested in the management of the former part, the one that is stored. From now on, we refer to this part of the feeding ration as the dry feed. The silos, where the dry feed is stored, have a constant maintenance cost. Indeed, this cost is negligible and can be considered to be zero. The dry feed is ordered to an external supplier. There is a fixed cost of a euros each time that an order is made; this fixed cost is mainly due to transportation. Each cow consumes about 10 kg of dry feed for producing about 30 liters of milk per day.
When there is a shortage of dry feed, the feeding ration has to be changed. The daily production of milk can be maintained but its quality decreases. So, although the cost of the feeding ration does not change significantly, there is a cost due to the economic impact of the decrease of the quality; this cost is b euros per ton and day.
For simplicity we consider an example with four dairy farms N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The dairy cattle is formed by 45, 95, 105 and 120 cows, respectively. The fixed cost per order is a = 180 (in euros) and the demand (in tons per day), the shortage costs (in euros per ton and day) and the capacity of silos (in tons) for each dairy farm are given in the next table, whose last column depicts the ratios demand/capacity. Assume that the dairy farms 1, 2 and 4 decide to cooperate by ordering together, so S = {1, 2, 4}. Let us compute c(S) = C S (x * S ). First we calculate i(S) and x * S . We proceed iteratively using the non-increasing arrangement of the dairy farms' ratios demand/capacity. Take T = {4} and compute
Let us note that S x T = {i ∈ S :
and S x T = T. Then, x T does not satisfy (11) and, consequently, x * S = x T and i(S) = T. Take now T = {2, 4} and compute Now, since S x T = {2, 4} = T, x T satisfies (11) and, consequently, i(S) = T = {2, 4} and x * S = x T = 0.117983. Finally, using (12), we have that 
Profitability of the grand coalition and cost allocation procedures
In the last section we obtained an expression for the minimum cost associated with each nonempty coalition S ⊂ N when its members place joint orders for a given EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) . In terms of cooperative game theory, we have obtained the cost game c associated to the system (N, a, b, d, K), c being a map which assigns to every non-empty S ⊂ N the real number C S (x * S ). So, from now on, we write 2
for every non-empty S ⊂ N. For the results we prove in this section, assume that a system (N, a, b, d, K) is given and that c is its associated cost game. We consider now the following issue. Is it profitable for the agents in N to form the grand coalition to place joint orders? In this section we prove that the answer to this question is positive because c is a subadditive game, in the sense that
for all S, T ∈ N with S ∪ T = ∅. Notice that the superadditivity condition implies that if N is partitioned into disjoint ordering coalitions (whose integrants place joint orders) the corresponding cost will not decrease.
In fact we prove that c is not only subadditive but also concave, in the sense that
for all j ∈ N and all S, T ⊂ N with S T ⊂ N \ j. It is a well known result in cooperative game theory that every concave game is subadditive. Moreover, the concavity property provides us with additional information about the game: the marginal contribution of an agent diminishes as a coalition grows (according to (13)).
Theorem 5.1. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs with associated cost game c. Then c is a concave game.
2 By convention, c(∅) = 0.
So we proved that in an EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) it is efficient that all players place joint orders. In that case, the optimal average cost per time unit is given by
An allocation rule for EOQ systems without holding costs is a map φ which assigns a vector φ(c) ∈ R N to every EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) with associated cost game c, satisfying that ∑ i∈N φ i (c) = c(N). Each component φ i (c) indicates the cost allocated to i, so an allocation rule for EOQ systems without holding costs is a procedure to allocate the optimal cost among the agents in N when they cooperate. An allocation rule should have good properties from the following points of view.
1. The proposal of the rule for a particular system should be computable in a reasonable CPU time, even when the number of agents is large.
2. It is very convenient that the rule proposes for every system an allocation which belongs to the core of the associated cost game (see, for instance, González-Díaz et al. (2010) for details on the core of a cooperative game). This means that, for every EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) with associated cost game c, φ should satisfy the following:
Notice that this condition assures that no group S is disappointed with the proposal of the rule, because the cost allocated to it is less than or equal to the cost it would support if its members formed a coalition to place joint orders independently of the agents in N \ S.
3. The proposal of the rule must be understandable and acceptable by the agents, in the sense that no one of them should feel unfairly treated.
Since the cost games associated to EOQ systems without holding costs are concave, cooperative game theory provides allocation rules for EOQ systems without holding costs with good properties at least with respect to items 2 and 3. We highlight the Shapley value and the nucleolus, which always provide core allocations in this context (see González-Díaz et al. (2010) for details on them). However, both allocations are hard to compute when the number of agents increases.
Next we define an allocation rule for EOQ systems without holding costs and discuss its qualification with respect to the three items enumerated above. In fact, the interest of this rule is that it selects in a very natural way a point in the core. It has excellent properties with respect to items 1 and 2, but its interest from the point of view of item 3 is not so clear.
Definition 5.1. The rule R we propose assigns to every EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) with associated cost game c the allocation vector R(c) ∈ R N given by:
otherwise.
This rule can be computed easily. Moreover, its complexity increases polynomially on the number of agents. So, it is clear that R is a good rule from the point of view of computability.
With respect to the second item, the following theorem shows that R proposes for every system an allocation which belongs to the core of the associated cost game. 3
Theorem 5.2. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs with associated cost game c. Then, for every S ⊂ N,
Now we make some comments on our rule R which have to do with the third item. R can be explained in the following way.
• Only agents having a large ratio demand/capacity will have to contribute to the payment of the ordering costs. With large ratio we mean that it is larger than the optimal number of orders per time unit.
• Each agent having a large ratio will pay his own shortage cost plus a part of the fixed cost which depends on his ratio. This part is computed in the following way.
Agent i's shortage cost per time unit when the number of orders per time unit is x * N and i ∈ i(N) is given by
Assuming that agent i ∈ i(N) pays his own shortage cost per time unit, then the part of the fixed cost per time unit that he pays according to R is given by
Then, the part of the fixed cost a that agent i ∈ i(N) pays each time that an order is made
which can be written as
Notice that R does not divide a in a proportional way among the agents in i(N). The first term is, in fact, a proportional splitting of a. The second term is a proportional division of the total average cost per cycle when each agent's deficit level equals his warehouse size. Finally, the third term is agent i's average cost per cycle when his deficit level is his warehouse size.
• Agents having a large ratio should probably re-dimension the capacity of their warehouses (in view of their demands). That is the reason why it does not seem unfair that they are forced to support the ordering costs.
We finish this section computing the proposal of R in Example 4.1 and comparing it with the proposal of other rules.
Example 5.1. Consider again the EOQ system without holding costs of Example 4.1 and its corresponding cost game. It can be easily proven that i(N) = {2, 3, 4}. Then R 1 (c) = 0. To obtain R i (c) for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, we compute
Finally, we compute the proposal for this example of other two well-known solution concepts, the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The proposal of the three rules are displayed in the next Observe that in this example the three rules consider that the bigger the ratio demand/capacity of an agent is the more that this agent will have to pay (this is not true in general). With this principle in mind the nucleolus tends to equalize the costs supported by the agents whereas our rule tends to take more account of the differences; the Shapley value plays a more moderate middle.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze multiple agent situations where each agent faces a continuous review inventory problem without holding costs, with shortages and with a limited capacity warehouse. We find a collective optimal policy when a group of agents agrees to cooperate placing joint orders. In this context we show that the formation of the largest possible coalition (the grand coalition) is profitable. Moreover we indicate how cooperative game theory can be used to allocate the cost among the agents and we identify a natural allocation for each problem which satisfies attractive properties from the points of view of computability and stability. We Proof. Take j ∈ N and S T ⊂ N \ j. We will prove that c(T ∪ j) − c(T) ≤ c(S ∪ j) − c(S). We distinguish two cases.
• If x * T ≥ x * S∪j , then
where the first inequality follows from the fact that x * T∪j gives the minimum value of C T∪j and the second line follows from Lemma A.1. If S = ∅, by Lemma A.1 and the fact that x * S gives the minimum value of C S ,
(S).
If S = ∅ then, by Lemma A.1
• If x * T < x * S∪j then following a similar reasoning as above we have
If S = ∅, by Lemma A.1 and the fact that x * S gives the minimum value of C S ,
If S = ∅ then x * T < x * S∪j becomes x * T < x * j and, by Lemma A.1
Proof of Theorem 5.2.
Proof. By the definition of the allocation rule R, it is clear that ∑ i∈N R i (c) = c(N). Take S ⊂ N. If S ∩ i(N) = ∅, then ∑ i∈S R i (c) ≤ c(S).
